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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of: 
BABY GIRL ~~RIE, a person under 
eighteen years of ase, 
NADINE MUNOZ, 
Appellant. 
Case No. 14599 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
APPEAL FRO:.! JUDGMENT OF THE FIRST 
DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT, IVEBER COUNTY, 
THE HONORABLE CHARLES E. BRADFORD, 
PRESIDING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Respondent, State of Utah, by and through 
the Utah Division of Family Services, respectfully petitions 
this court for rehearing in the above entitled cause and 
alegcs thut the court in its majority opinion erred on the 
following points: 
POINT I: IT WAS IMPROPER FOR A SUCCESSOR 
JUDGE I~HO DID NOT HEAR ORAL ARGU-
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POINT II: 
POINT III: 
~1ENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE 
DECISION OF THE INSTANT 
CASE. 
'I"HE COURT ERRED IN ITS CON-
CLUSIONS AS TO ALLEGATIONS 
AND CONDITIONS SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT A 'l'ERI-liNATION 
DECREE. 
THE COURT IN VACATING THE 
ORDER OF TERMINATION, 
FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
LEGAL EFFECT OF INTERVEN-
ING ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS 
OR TO GIVE LEGAL DEFER-
ENCE TO THE BEST INTERESTS 
OF THE CHILD. 
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays that this action 
be reheard by this Honorable Court, that such rehearing 
be scheduled for an early setting and that the fore-
going errors of the court be corrected in the interest 
of law and justice. 
-2-
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
FP.ANKLY!\ R. HATHESO:l 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IT WAS I~WROPER FOR A SUCCESSOR 
JUDGE WHO DID NOT HEAR ORAL ARGUMENT 
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DECISION OF THE 
INSTANT CASE. 
The instant case was heard on oral argument before 
the Supreme Court on November 11, 1976. Oral argument was 
granted on Motion of Petitioner, good cause appearing there-
fore. The Honorable F. Henri Henriod, Chief Justice, and 
the following duly elected or appointed Judges heard the 
oral argument: Justice A. H. Ellett, Justice J. Allan Crockett, 
Justice Richard J. Maughan and Justice D. Frank Wilkins. On 
or about December 31, 1976, before the decision of the court 
was filed, Chief Justice Henriod retired from the Bench. On 
January 3, 1977, Justice Gordon R. Hall, was appointed by the 
Governor to fill the vacancy on the court. Decision in this 
case was filed February 24, 1977. Justice Hall had not heard 
or participated in the oral argument. Justice Maughan wrote 
the majority opinion, joined by Justices Wilkins and Hall. 
Both Justices Ellett and Crockett dissented and wrote dis-
senting opinions. The vote of Justice Hall, who was not 
a member of the court at the time the matter was heard or 
a participant therein, was in effect, the deciding vote. 
Without his vote the matter would have been deadlocked two 
to two and the cause of the Petitioner denied. 
-3-
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We believe that participation by Judge Hall in 
the decision of this appeal was improper and that for this 
reason a rehearing should be granted. 
To our knowledge there is no provision in our State 
Constitution, statutes or rules of practice in regard the 
powers of successor appellate judges. It is also acknowledged 
that most of the reported authority as to the powers of suc-
cessor judges deals with trial judges. (See 22 A.L.R. 3d 922) 
The exact question of whether or not a successor judge of 
our Supreme Court is precluded from participating in the 
decision of a matter heard on oral argument by his predeces-
sor is, we believe, a question of first instance. However, 
by analogy to related cases and on the basis of fair play, 
we feel there is persuasive reason to find that it was im-
proper for Judge Hall to participate in the decision of the 
instant case. 
In the case of Cordner v. Cordner, 91 U. 474, 64 p. 2c 
828 (1937), the question was raised as to whether or not a su~ 
cessor judge who did not participate in the original decision 
could participate in the question of a petition for re-
hearing. In a per curiam decision this court said no, 
holding that the new member of the court should not particr-
pate in the consideration of a petition for rehearing. The 
original decision was rendered on a 3-2 vote. Though thP 
Cordner case deals with participation of a successor judge 
-4-
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after the original decision was legally rendered, we think 
the reasoning of the court in that case is significant and 
perhaps determinative of our present situation. The Court 
stated: 
The effect of the participation 
of a new member of the court, where 
the court is evenly divided on the 
question after t~e retirement of the 
former member, would establish a 
precedent frough~ with dangerous im-
plications. (64P.2d 828). 
This reasoning is on all fours with our position 
in the instant case. After the retirement of Justice Henriod, 
who participated in the hearing of our case, the court was 
evenly divided. To allow Justice Hall, a new member of the 
court, to participate in the decision and in effect cast 
the deciding vote "establishes a precedent fraught with 
dangerous implications." Certainly this was the effect as to 
the respondent. 
The Cordner case goes on to say: 
it would be mischievous in a 
high degree to permit the re-opening of 
controversies every time a new judge takes 
his place in the court . (64 P.2d 829). 
\ve submit that to permit Judge Hall to participate 
in the decision, after the oral argument which was apparently 
felt to be of utmost inportance to the Petitioner, was 
mischievous. 
-5-
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The Cordner case cites a previous Utah case in In 
Re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 269 P. 103 (1927), \·:hich 
in turn had cited with approval a Montana case of Gas Prod-
ucts Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 376, 207 P. 993, 24 A.L.R. 294 
(1922). In the Montana case a district judge substituted 
for an incapacitated supreme court justice. A 3-2 decision 
was rendered by the court, the district judge voting ~ith 
the majority. The incapacitated judge subseque'-tly died and 
was replaced. Even so, on the petition for rehearing, the 
new justice was excluded from participating and the district 
judge who participated in the original decisio~ sat with the 
other members of the court to hear the petition ~or re~earing. 
In the case of Woodbury v. Dorran, 15 Minn. 341, like~ise 
cited with approval in the Thoreson case, supra, a ~i~~esota 
Court held it would be "a violation of pro!='rietys ir. tr.e ad-
r.tinistration of justice" to allm-: a successor j·..:dge ·,.·:-.o did 
not participate in the original hearinc to part~ci~ate in t~e 
question of a petition for re~eari:-.g. l:e s·..:t:-:-it t:-.2.-: if it 
is improper for a justice \,·ho did not partic~~ate i:-. tr.e 
original hearing to participate i'- t~e pet~t~c~ for re~ear~'-5• 
it is equally ir.1proper, nay r.ore sc, fer 2 j·..:stic':' ·.·:-.o d~c -~· 
participate in the original ~caring to part:c~;~te '- t:-e 
original decision. 
ir..portar.cc on the or2.2. arc;-..:.~e::~ .s~a:;c c~ :~.~ ___ ~~.:..~~-
In rel:;uttal ,..e respc·:~;:; as .:c2 2c. ·": 
- E-
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Petitio~er classified his appeal as "an equity pro-
ceeding of the highest degree" (Brief of Appellant, pg. 5) 
to whic~ we agree. See also Jones v. Moore, et al., 6, Utah 
383, 213 P. 191 (1923); ~elson ''· Pierce, 14 U 2d 317, 383 
P.2d 925 (1963). This court was free to review both the facts 
a~~ the la~ in arri~ing at its decision. It is obvious from 
the ~ritten decision t~at tte najority opinion was greatly in-
fl..:en:::e8 bi' state:-.ents of allege~ fact by Petitio:1er's Counsel 
i:1 :-.is trief and at the ti:-:-e of oral arg·.l.cent. For exa1:1ple, 
i:-. re::3.r:i to t~e ~.:er:r· c:-itical q...:.es~i:,:: c;: lac!"\es 0:1 the part 
a~~are:-:':.2.·: chose to belie7e assertions 
. . . 
recc.::-d. (Decisior., 
c~ ..:.se: a-: t:-.e cepri·;ation 
..-;:. -.-. .::.. , It •·ou!:! 
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influence on the writer of the majority opinion, in that he 
accepts counsel's unsupported allegations on the one hand but 
rejects findings, based upon uncontroverted representations, 
by the trial court on the other. In any event, review of 
facts whether real or imaginary, was apparently very critical 
in the decision of this case and we think it important that 
all the judges who participated in the decision should have 
had opportunity to hear argument in relation thereto. 
Apparently, Petitioner felt likewise in requesting oral 
argument. It seems improper to us that the deciding vote ~n 
any equity case with such deep emotional and sociological 
significance should be decided by a justice who was neither 
a member of the bench at the time of, nor a participant in, 
the oral argument. 
In the early, early case of People v. Tid·.·:ell, 5 Ute: 
88, 12 P. 638 (1887), a decision of this court \,•as challenged 
on the basis that a justice who sat in the hearing of the 
case and participated in the decision, was not a legal member 
of the court at the time of the hearing. This, again, is not 
our precise situation, and in any event, the court held it 
would not examine into the matter of the justice's standing 
on a motion for rehearing. But the court's discus,~ ion of th·· 
question is very interesting. The court rcccv;nizcd th.1t the 
justice's standing would have been il legitin,:ttc qtt• sti(•:1 if 
timely raised, but concluded that thL· CJllf'o;t ic•n \·.' ". n·.tll; 
no consequence becausc the justic·· involvc·J eli l nC>~ <~•;:·,·c 
-8-
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with the majority, but dissente~ so his vote did not effect 
the result. We emphasize that in the instant case, the 
justice whose authority is questioned, voted on the majority 
side, and his vote was to the contrary, of dire consequence. 
l'ie submit that one of two courses should now be 
follmved: 
1. The decision of the court should be reversed on 
the basis th~t a successor justice voting for Petitioner in 
the majority decision was not a member of the court or a 
participant in the case at the time of the oral argument. 
2. A rehearing should be grctntcd and or;ll ,trqumf!nt 
permitted before the court as presently constituted. 
- 'J-
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIO~ 
AS TO ALLEGATIONS AND CONDITIONS SUFFI-
CIENT TO SUPPORT A TER!1INATION DECREE. 
Improper conclusion by the court either as to law 
or fact justifies a rehearing of the case. In re HcKnight, 
4 U. 237, 9 P. 299 (1886) 
The majority opinion concludes that an all~gation 
that a natural mother is unable to provide for the financial 
support or needs of her child is insufficient to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court in an involuntary termination 
proceeding. This conclusion is apparently based upon the 
Court's construction of Section 55-10-109(1) (a), which reads: 
(1) The court may decree a termina-
tion of all parental rights with respect to 
one or both parents if the court finds: 
(a) That the parents are unfit or in-
competent by reason of conduct or condition 
seriously detrimental to the child;. 
Juvenile Court proceedings are civil in nature. 
(Section 55-10-105 U.C.A. 1953). In a juvenile court pro-
ceeding the precise language of the statute need not be 
stated or used in the pleading if the qualifying circum-
stances are alleged. The pleadings should be liberally 
construed. The petitioner did not usc the words "unfit" or 
''incompetent" in the petition. But it did allc,Jc a condition 
seriously detrimental to the child, which if proven would 
obviously render the mother unfit or incOfl'[>C,tc:nt to care 
for the child; to-wit, inability of the mother to pl~oviclc:' 
-10-
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bed or board for her child. It is difficult to conceive of 
a situation more detrimental to the welfare of the child. 
We submit the court was wrong in concluding that such 
allegation was insufficient to invoke the jursidiction of 
the court under the wording of Section 55-10-109(1) (a). 
The court also concludes that even if proveq, in-
ability to support will not justify a termination decree. 
"Impecuniosity will not support a termination decree." We 
believe this conclusion is likewise in error. 
In a series of cases this court has recognized 
that the condition of the parent, regardless of the fault 
or conduct of the parent, may be seriously detrimental to 
the child and justify termination of parental rights by 
a juvenile court. 
In the case of In re State in the Interest of 
Jennings., 20 U 2d 50, 432 P.2d 879 (1967) the juvenile 
court terminated a natural mother's parental rights to twin 
boys born out of wedlock upon finding that the mother was 
"emotionally unstable." Specifically citing Section 55-10-
109(1) (a) this court affirmed the action of the juvenile 
court. In its opinion this court specifically referred to 
the fact that the mother had contributed only a minimal 
amount to the support of the children, and further that the 
children were illegitimate and sired by an unknown father, 
apparently being influenced by these considerations. In the 
case of In re StatP in the Interest of Mullin, 29 Ut 2d 376, 
-11-
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510 P.2d 720 (1973), this court, although obviously per-
suaded by a heinous act of the natural father, likewise 
affirmed termination of parental rights on the basis of the 
"emotional instability" of the parent. In the case State, 
in the Interest of T.G~, 532 P.2d 997 (1975) this court 
affirmed a termination of parental rights by a juvenile court 
on finding that the natural mother had inadequate parental 
supervisory skills, was a poor housekeeper and of low moral 
standards. In the recent case of State of Utah, in the 
interest of Ricky Winger, 558 P.2d 1311. (Dec. 17, 1976-
No. 14368) this court reversed a juvenile court termination 
order based upon findings of emotional stability, but not 
upon the grounds that such condition might not justify de-
privation of parental rights under Section 55-10-109 (l) (a), 
but upon the grounds that there had not been a sufficient 
showing in that case that such condition was immediately 
detrimental or harmful to the child. In the case of State, 
in the Interest of Summers Children, 560 P.2d 331, (l-31-77), 
the most recent termination appeal of which we are aware, 
this court affirmed the juvenile court on the basis that 
there had been an "abandonment" by the natural father under 
Section 55-10-109 (1) (b), and did not revie\<J the issue of 
"unfitness" under Section 55-10-109 (l) (a). The court did, 
however, sustain the abandonment on finding, amonq other things, 
that the father had not provided financial support for his 
children. If failure to provide financial support v:ill 
support a finding of abandoment under Section 5')-10-lO'l ( 1) (b), 
-12-
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we feel it should with equal validity support a finding of 
unfitness under Section 55-10-109 (l) (a). We urge therefore 
that an allegation that a mother is unable to provide financial 
support or care for the needs of her child is sufficient to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Section 
55-10-109(1) (a), and that a finding of such condition of the 
mother is sufficient to support a termination decree based 
upon unfitness or inco~tency under said Section. 
Apparently the court also feels that the evidence 
doesn't support a finding of inability to support. This being 
the case, we feel the appropriate course in a matter of such 
moment would be to remand the case for further hearing in the 
trial court as to that issue. 
For this court to only revoke the termination decree 
with nothing more, may recreate a situation where the child 
is simply restored to foster care, a situation which may 
last indefinately or at least so long as the mother is unable 
to care for the child. The child may never have a permanent 
home and may be destined to perpetual public support. This 
latter circumstance is contrary to the expressed direction 
of the Legislature. (Section 78-45-4 U.C.A 1953 as amended-
dut'/ of womon to support her child). And the former circum-
stance of maintaining the child without permanent parental 
tics is abhorant to public policy. As stated by Justice 
Crockett in In n' adoption of ~ , 122 U. 525, 252 P.2d 
223 (1951): 
-13-
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Public Policy favors the adoption 
of children who are left without parental 
refuge. Once a child has been cast adrift 
and is without responsible parental care, 
the policy of the law should be to assist 
in every way in establishing a satisfactory 
parent-child and family relationship. 
Adoptive parents should not be discouraged 
by a construction of the law which would 
cause them to fear the consequences of 
accepting a child because of the knowledge 
that the fate of their efforts would be at 
the will of the natural parent. (252 P.2d 229) 
POINT III 
THE COURT IN VACATING THE ORDER OF 
TERMIHATIOH 1 FAILED TO CO!lSIDER THE LEGAL 
EFFECT OF INTERVENING ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS 
OR TO GIVE LEGAL DEFEREtlCE TO THE BEST IN-
TERESTS OF THE CHILD. 
Failure of the appeal court to consider material 
points in the case is grounds for rehearing. (In re :-lcKnight, 
supra). 
On a close reading of the court's opinion we find 
no consideration given regarding the legal effect of inter-
vening adoption proceedings or any mention made as to the best 
interests of the child, both of which points were raised by 
respondent on appeal. (Brief of Respondent Points I and VI). 
\•le complain of this exclusion not from vJounded vanity, but 
because both points are by previous case decision material 
to the issue of permanent deprivation of parental rights. As 
we understand, the majority opinion bases its decision on the 
matters of sufficiency of pleadings, invocation of jurisdiction, 
and compliance with statute. 
-14-
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In the case of Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 
P. 716 (1914), the natural mother in a habeas corpus proceeding 
sought to recover custody of an infant child whom she had de-
livered through a third party to defendants for purposes of 
adoption shortly after its birth. In a lengthy and monumental 
opinion, the court discussed, among other things, the matter of 
"legal rights" in a custody contest. The court said: 
719): 
This court is now firmly co~~itted 
to the doctrine that in such proceedings 
we will be controlled by what appears to 
be the best interests and welfare of the 
child, rather than by the naked legal 
right of those claiming it. 
(142 Pac. 
We gather frorn this language that in custody cases 
there are matters of grave irnport which should be considered 
by the appellate court, matters which perhaps transcend 
technicalities of the law and "naked legal rights." Justice 
Crockett in In Pe Adoption of D __ , supra, suggests that each 
of these type of cases depends upon its own facts, and enuner-
ates several important things that should be considered, in-
eluding the length of time the adopting parents have had the 
child; any "vested rights" that have intervened; the welfare 
of the child, and the conduct, as well as the character and 
ability of the respective claimants. All of these things 
sec~ed to have been lost in the instant case in the shadow 
of a contron:rted issue as to whether or not Petitioner had 
been advised of her right to counsel. 
-15-
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One wonders in all this legal haggle over ~hether 
this is a case of voluntary or involuntary ternination, 
whether inability to provide constitutes "unfitness,'' whether 
the Juvenile Court had jurisdiction or not, whether Petitioner 
had waived or had not waived her right to counsel, ar.c whether 
or not Petitioner had or had not, at the final hearir.g, been 
advised of her right to counsel--one wonders through all this 
as to who is speaking for the child. ~fuat are the rights of 
the child? Since we are only deciding relationships for the 
rest of her life, what does the child have to say abcut it? 
Where is her guardian ad litem? In the first place, her 
mother voluntarily gave her over to the Division of Far.1ily 
Services because she could not take care of her. The child 
had nothing to say about that. Fifteen months later, ~other 
petitioner asks for her back, and now after three ye~rs in an-
other horne, the only horee she has ever kno~n, this court says 
back you go--and her interests are apparently not tc be cor.-
sidered. The juvenile judge tried to speak for her, ~herein 
he said: 
\fuere there is a conflict l::t'tl·ee:-~ 
the interests--and even the rights--of 
parents and those of their children this 
court is obliged to give pre-e8inence to 
the children's interests and ri~hts. ~o 
take this child from her adootive o~rents 
who have been found bv the olstrici Cc~rt 
to be fit and qualifi~d, and return ~e~ 
to an unrc.rried nother 1:::o co:-.cc:. \'CC: !'.2:· 
and bore her out of ~edlock by a ~~n 5~( 
cannot e¥e~ ~a~e vould L,e a gr2\"C i~~~s~ic· 
to the chi:!.d, to the lo•:inc; aco:·ti·.·c ,.:::·c~.~s 
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and probably even to the natural mother, 
who might then yet again be found incom-
petent to care for the child and go 
through the process all over again. 
Certainly the !'\other \o/as afforded 
more formality and far more protection of 
her rights by the judicial proceedings held 
in the instant case than would have been 
the case had she just signed over the child 
in the usual manner to Division of Family 
Services or other placement agency. 
(MeDoranduD Decision, Case No. 252370, Dis-
trict Juvenile Court for Heber County, May 
11, 1976) 
Our child's cause \·;as perhaps r.-.ore adequately 
statea in the case of In Re Adoption of Richardson, 59 Cal. 
Rptr. 323 (1967), wherein the California Court of Appeals ac-
cepted the testi~ony of Dr. Arthur H. Parmelee, Jr., Director 
of t~e Pediatrics Clinic at the University of California at 
Los Angeles as to the impact over a nine month old child on 
separation from the only parents it had known: 
Disruption of the continuity of care 
of this baby at his present age is critical 
and could be permanently damaging to him. 
It is \:ell kno;-m that babies nanifest their 
greatest anxiety over separation from their 
parents in the age period of eight months 
to t•·:o years. This little boy is nou being 
separated fro~ the only parents he knows. 
He will go into a ter:1porary foster hor.1e 
where he will try to make new attachments. 
r;hen h~ will be placfed in a neu home and 
the eJ'T\otional separation from his foster 
ho~e will take place. This sequence of 
events in that age period can be devastating 
to the develop~ent of healthy emotional at-
tachments to people for the remainder of 
this child's life. (Emphasis in original) 
In a letter to the editor appearing in the Salt 
Lake ~rit~ne on ~arch 4, 1977, Dr. Delbert T. Goates, M. D., 
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Child Psychiatrist, on reading of the instant case, wrote: 
The Utah Supreme Court has legally 
abused another child. . romantic de-
cisions, such as this, in favor of the 
'natural' mother are devoid of justice 
for the child. If the young mother 
were standing alone two years ago, at 16 
years of age, consider the plight of the 
three-year-old subjected to the recent 
abuse of the Utah Supreme Court. Even if 
the juvenile court had erred, removing the 
child, a second wrong, will not make a 
right. Compassionate parents of three-
year-olds everywhere readily recognize, 
as did Judges Ellett and Crockett, 'that 
the court was not considering the welfare 
of the child' in transplanting her so 
cavalierly at three years of age. 
In the Harrison v. Harker case, supra, Justice 
Frick states the matter as a legal proposition by quoting 
from the earlier case of Hummel v. Parrish, 13~ Pac. 898 
(1913), as follows thus: 
The legal presumption is that it 
is for the best interests of the child 
and of society for the child to remain 
with its natural parents during the per-
iod of its minority, and be maintained, 
cared for, and educated by them and under 
their supervision and direction. But tl1is 
is not an absolute right of the parent. 
The decisions rendered in this class of 
cases almost universally hold that where, 
as here, a parent has surrendered the con-
trol of his child when it was a toddling 
infant to other parties, and permitted 
them to maintain, clothe, feed, and care 
for it ... and a strong reciprocal mu-
tual affection has grown up between the 
child and its foster parents, . and 
the parent seeks to recover possession 
of the child, the natural or presumptiv~ 
right of the parent cannot prevail, if 
the interests and welfare of the child 
forbid it. The law in such cases regard~ 
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the welfare and permanent interest of the 
child much more ir.1portant than the natural 
or presUQptive right of the parent. In 
other words, the paramount consiceration 
in such cases is the well-being of the 
child. If it appears to the court that 
the physical, intellectual, social, moral, 
and educational training and general wel-
fare and happiness of the child will be 
best promoted by leaving it with the fos-
ter parents, the presumptive right of the 
natural parent must yield to the interests 
of the child. (142 Pac. 719) 
The court states in our instant case that the Juven-
ile Court did not comply with the provisions of Section 55-10-109; 
it thus exceeded its jurisdiction, and the termination order 
was void, subject to direct attack in a proceeding to vacate. 
So be it. But in the interests of the child, s~~~ld their 
not te so~e court recognized statute of limitations. Is 
said decree to be subject to attack at 15 r.1onths, three-years, 
five-years, ten-years? 
Over and over the court has said that the interests 
of the child are parar.1ount in custody cases. He think it was 
error for the court to seer.1ingly ignore this rule in the in-
stant case and that said error is grounds for rehearing. 
cm:CLUSiotl 
The day the court's decision was issued, I looked 
at ~y little three-year old girl lying asleep on her bed, 
te~dy bear tucked under one arm and blonde locks loosely 
scattered on the pillow slip, and said to myself, "My God, 
what if I were the adoptive parent of Baby Girl Marie?" 
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Respondent, child placement agencies, social 
service workers, psychologists, needful children, aooptive 
applicants, adoptive parents and all parents who have three-
year old children view with alarm the impact of the court's 
decision. As lawyers, we should, of course, be equally con-
cerned about the rights and feelings of the natural rother, 
and we would be if we could feel her rights have,in fact, 
been ignored and that she had made diligent and timely ef-
forts to recover custody of the child. But the court has 
reviewed these procedural matters, discussed theM in its 
opinion and we do not ask a rereview of same as justification 
for a rehearing of the appeal. 
We do earnestly feel, however, that a rehearing is 
justified and should be granted on the basis, as arg~ed under 
Point I, that Justice Hall, who cast a decisive vote in the cas~, 
was neither a member of the court nor did he partici::>a.te in 
the oral argllr.'.ent of the case. 1\e believe this circ::-'star.ce 
is critical in the instant case. Furthe~ we crge re~earing 
on the basis that the court erred in its co~clusic~s as to 
the sufficiency of the allegations mace by the reti tic:--._r ir. 
its initial Petition and as to the jurisdiction c~ t~e Juven-
ile Court based thereon, as argueC. in Point I~ ar.~ ~n t~e 
basis that the court £aile~ to consiC.er t~c le~a! c~~cct of 
intervening adoption proceedings or to give ccr.sij~~~~icr. 
to the best interests of t:-:.2 c:1ilC::, as a:-~--=~-~ ·~ ?c~:--~ '---· 
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l-Ie respectful:!.;: and sincerely request a recon-
sideration and reversal o: tr.e rr,ajori ty opinion for these 
reasons. 
- 2 ::.-
Respectfully sub~itted, 
ROBERT B. HANSE:; 
At~orney General 
~~---Li;-- J3 /1'~ a-r----
F~~~LYN B. ~~TEESO~ 
Assista&t Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respo~dent 
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